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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 United Transportation Union, Local 1589, AFL-CIO (the 
"Union") appeals a district court order vacating an arbitration 
award in favor of Joseph Nagy, a former employee of Suburban 
Transit Corporation ("Suburban").  Because we agree with the 
Union that the district court failed to accord the arbitration 
award proper deference, we will reverse. 
  
 I. 
 A. 
 Suburban and the Union are parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement ("CBA").  Under the CBA, Suburban is given 
certain rights to discipline and discharge its employees, and the 
Union is entitled to contest any disciplinary action of 
management.  The parties agreed in the CBA to submit to 
arbitration any grievance that they cannot resolve. 
 More specifically, Article I, Section 5 of the CBA 
states that "[t]he Union recognizes the right of the Company to 
exercise all functions of management, including . . . the right 
to hire, promote, demote, transfer, and discipline or discharge 
for proper cause."  CBA, art. I § 5.  The same provision explains 
that "[t]he Union shall retain the right to contest any action of 
management in accordance with the appropriate provisions of this 
contract."  In Article IV, entitled "Discipline Procedure," the 
CBA sets forth eleven sections describing a variety of 
disciplinary procedures.  For most alleged infractions, an 
employee is entitled to a hearing before discipline is imposed.  
However, in certain circumstances, Suburban has the right to 
suspend the employee immediately and then promptly hold a 
hearing.  In virtually all circumstances, an employee may appeal 
from his hearing to "the highest officer of Suburban" (CBA art. 
IV, § 3), and if the parties cannot resolve their differences 
even at this stage, "the dispute may be presented to an 
arbitrator selected through the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association or the N.J. State Board of Mediation . . . ."  Id. 
  
art. V, § 1(d).  With respect to arbitration, the parties agree 
that "[t]he determination of th[e] arbitrator shall be final and 
binding on both parties" (id.), but the CBA also explains that 
the arbitrator's authority is not plenary;  rather, 
 [a]uthority of the arbitrator shall be 
limited to the determination of the dispute 
or grievance arising out of the 
interpretation, application or operation of 
the provisions of this agreement on 
submission of the issues involved by the 
parties to this agreement.  He shall not have 
any authority whatsoever to alter, amend or 
modify any of the provisions of this 
agreement. 
Id. art. V, § 3. 
 B. 
 On December 15, 1992, Nagy was involved in a bus 
accident on the New Jersey Turnpike:  he rear-ended a tractor 
trailer because he was tailgating.  In his 12 years of 
employment, he had been involved in 24 accidents, nine of which 
were deemed preventable.  This was his third preventable rear-end 
collision. 
 Suburban fired Nagy, and the Union protested.  When the 
parties could not resolve their dispute, the matter was submitted 
to arbitration on the following questions: 
 Was the discharge of Joseph Nagy for just cause? 
 If not, what shall be the remedy? 
 After a hearing, the arbitrator ruled that Nagy was 
responsible for the accident, but that Suburban should not have 
fired him.  Instead, the arbitrator concluded, discharge was too 
harsh a sanction for a long term employee where the employee had 
  
been afforded no opportunity to improve his driving skills 
through a retraining program. 
 Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(d), the Union and Suburban 
moved in the district court to enforce and vacate, respectively, 
the arbitrator's award.  The district court, in a written 
opinion, denied the Union's motion to enforce and granted 
Suburban's motion to vacate the award, reasoning that the 
arbitrator had read into the CBA terms that were not there.  The 
district court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 II. 
 On appeal, the Union argues that because the 
arbitrator's award was at least arguably based on a construction 
of the CBA, the district court erred when it granted Suburban's 
motion to vacate the award.  We agree. 
 A. 
 District courts have very little authority to upset 
arbitrators' awards.  As we explained in News America 
Publications, Inc. v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 
F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1990), "courts play an extremely limited role in 
resolving labor disputes."  Id. at 24.  "A court may not overrule 
an arbitrator simply because it disagrees with the arbitrator's 
construction of the contract . . . or because it believes its 
interpretation of the contract is better than that of the 
arbitrator."  Id. (internal citation omitted).  Rather, "[a]s 
long as the arbitrator has arguably construed or applied the 
contract, the award must be enforced, regardless of the fact that 
  
a court is convinced that [the] arbitrator has committed a 
serious error."  Id.  Thus, "there must be absolutely no support 
at all in the record justifying the arbitrator's determinations 
for a court to deny enforcement of an award."  Id.  "[O]nly where 
there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally 
unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of 
the shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award."  Id. 
(internal quotation omitted).  Thus, as we wryly concluded, "[i]t 
should be clear that the test used to probe the validity of a 
labor arbitrator's decision is a singularly undemanding one."  
Id. 
 Although News America is notable for the thoroughness 
of its exposition, it is by no means the only source of our 
longstanding disinclination to allow district courts to overturn 
arbitration awards.  To the contrary, our case law is uniform on 
this point.  E.g., Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Local 1846, UMW, 812 
F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[e]ven when the award was dubious, 
and the result one that we would not have reached had the matter 
been submitted to the court originally, we have upheld the 
arbitrator's decision"); United Indus. Workers v. Government of 
the Virgin Islands, 987 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 1993) (scope of 
review is "narrowly circumscribed"); Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. 
Newark Typographical Union, 797 F.2d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 1986) (our 
"strict standard means that a reviewing court will decline to 
sustain an award `only in the rarest case'").  As long as an 
arbitrator's decision arguably construes or "draws its essence" 
from the CBA, a district court is not permitted to vacate the 
  
award.  "An arbitration award draws its essence from the 
bargaining agreement if `the interpretation can in any rational 
way be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its 
language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' 
intention."  Tanoma Min. Co., Inc. v. Local Union No. 1269, UMWA, 
896 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1990), quoting and adding emphasis to 
Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 
1969).  Only when an arbitrator "acted in manifest disregard of 
the law, or if the record before the arbitrator reveals no 
support whatsoever for the arbitrator's determination," may a 
district court invade the province of the arbitrator.  United 
Indus. Workers, 987 F.2d at 170. 
 The reason for such a lenient standard is not difficult 
to discern.  "[F]requent judicial disapproval of the awards of 
labor arbitrators would tend to undermine a system of private 
ordering that is of the highest importance to the well-being of 
employer and worker alike."  Newark Morning Ledger, 797 F.2d at 
165. 
 B. 
 With these considerations in mind, we turn to the 
district court's decision to vacate the arbitration award in this 
case.  Although the district court recognized that it had limited 
authority to review in this case, the court nevertheless found 
that the arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from the CBA 
here because the arbitrator "read[] into" the CBA terms that were 
not there -- specifically, provisions dealing with retraining, 
progressive discipline, setting criteria for retraining, and 
  
defining who is entitled to retraining.  This conclusion, 
however, was inaccurate. 
 Contrary to the district court's reasoning, the 
arbitrator did not impermissibly "read into" the parties' 
agreement terms that were not there.  Rather, the arbitrator 
simply interpreted the ambiguous term "proper cause" in a manner 
unsatisfactory to management.  The CBA allows Suburban to 
discipline or discharge for "proper cause" (art I, § 5), but does 
not define the phrase.  When the grievance was submitted to 
arbitration, the arbitrator was forced to decide what "proper 
cause" meant (or "just cause" according to the language of the 
questions submitted to arbitration, supra p. 4).  We cannot say 
that the arbitrator was engrafting provisions onto the CBA when 
he evidently decided that he must decide whether it was fitting 
(a synonym for "proper") and fair or equitable (two synonyms of 
"just," the term used in the actual submission to the arbitrator) 
for Suburban to have discharged a long-term employee for the 
accident in question.  In making this determination, the 
arbitrator wrote that although it was clear that Nagy had been 
negligent, what was not clear was the "validity of the 
punishment" imposed by Suburban.  He noted that although Nagy had 
been involved in many accidents, some were minor and occurred 
shortly after he was hired, and he had also received three annual 
safety awards.  The arbitrator also explained that Nagy had never 
been offered any retraining despite Suburban's recent decision to 
implement such a program.  This surprised and concerned the 
arbitrator because Nagy was a "veteran employee who has given 
  
loyal service to his company for some twelve years."  Taking all 
of this into account, the arbitrator apparently determined that 
Suburban had proper cause to punish Nagy in some manner, but not 
to discharge him.  Thus, the arbitrator concluded that Nagy was 
properly punished through the suspension he had served, "it being 
understood that [Nagy] shall cooperate with management in 
undergoing a retraining program." 
 Suburban protests that this interpretation of the 
phrase "proper cause" imposed upon the company a "progressive 
discipline" system not bargained for by the parties.  The 
complete answer to this contention is that the parties bargained 
for contractual ambiguity instead of defining "proper cause" in 
the CBA.  Having decided not to define the phrase, Suburban 
cannot escape the results of that bargain simply because the 
arbitrator has chosen to interpret that phrase differently than 
Suburban may have wanted -- even if Suburban's interpretation of 
the CBA is more reasonable than the result announced by the 
arbitrator.  News America, 918 F.2d at 24 ("[i]n reviewing an 
arbitral award, courts must recognize that the parties bargained 
for the arbitrator's construction of the agreement"); Roberts & 
Schaefer Co. v. Local 1846, UMW, 812 F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1987) 
("after bargaining for the decision of this arbitrator, the 
Company cannot avoid his decision merely because the arbitrator 
may have reached an incorrect result").  To the extent the 
arbitrator's award was based upon a theory that the parties 
intended "proper cause" to incorporate some form of progressive 
  
discipline, that interpretation has some basis in the CBA.1  And 
in any event, even if the arbitrator's interpretation of the 
phrase "proper cause" did, in effect, impose a progressive 
discipline system upon the parties, we have recognized that such 
a result can be a justified interpretation of a "just cause" 
provision.  See Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752 
(3d Cir. 1982) ("`[i]n a proper case an arbitrator . . . may 
construe a "just cause" provision of a labor contract to include 
a progressive discipline requirement and may determine that 
certain conduct is "just cause" for discipline but not for 
discharge'" (quoting Mistletoe Express Service v. Motor 
Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1977))). 
 In sum, that the arbitrator's interpretation of "proper 
cause" was a legitimate reading of that phrase compels the 
conclusion that the arbitrator's award both construed and drew 
                     
1
.   The CBA itself could be read to require differing gradations 
of punishment based upon different degrees of culpability.  The 
CBA discusses "minor infractions," which have less formal 
adjudicative procedures, and more serious infractions, including 
rear-end collisions, which trigger Suburban's right to 
immediately suspend the driver, but which also trigger a driver's 
right to a hearing if suspension is imposed.  See CBA art. IV, 
§§ 5, 7, 8.  The procedures for resolving these more serious 
infractions do not state that a driver must be fired if he is 
found responsible for wrongdoing; in fact, the phrasing clearly 
contemplates that suspension is a punishment short of -- and only 
potentially leading to -- discharge.  See id. § 8.  Thus, the CBA 
contemplates that some actions that may be cause for suspension 
will not be cause for discharge, and the arbitrator did not 
manifestly disregard the CBA in taking into consideration the 
context in which the dispute arose (Nagy's conduct, his tenure, 
his overall driving record, and Suburban's recent adoption of a 
driver retraining program) in deciding Nagy's culpability and the 
propriety of firing him, as opposed to merely suspending him. 
  
its essence from the CBA.  That being the case, the district 
court had no grounds to vacate the award. 
 C. 
 Suburban urges that if we find that the district court 
erred in vacating the arbitration award, we should nevertheless 
affirm the district court on the ground that the award violates 
public policy.  Essentially, Suburban argues that public policy 
demands that common carriers provide safe carriage to their 
passengers, and that the arbitration award undermines this 
policy.  However, we decline Suburban's invitation to invalidate 
the award on public policy grounds. 
 Arbitration awards rendered pursuant to collective 
bargaining agreements can be vacated when such awards violate 
public policy.  W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 
757, 766 (1983).  However, the public policy "must be well 
defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained `by reference to 
the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations 
of supposed public interests.'"  Id. at 766, quoting Muschany v. 
United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945).  Although we have rejected 
the argument that an arbitration award may be set aside on public 
policy grounds only when it "violates positive law," we have 
stressed that a public policy must be "well defined and dominant" 
before it may be used to upset an arbitrator's award.  Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1192, 1194 
(3d Cir. 1993) (arbitration award vacated as against public 
policy when it required shipping company to reinstate able bodied 
seaman on oil tanker after seaman was found to be highly 
  
intoxicated while on duty); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon 
Seaman's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Stroehmann Bakeries, 
Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 
(3d Cir. 1992).  In determining whether a public policy exists, 
federal courts must use common sense, keeping in mind that "a 
formulation of public policy based only on `general 
considerations of supposed public interests' is not the sort that 
permits a court to set aside an arbitration award that was 
entered in accordance with a valid collective bargaining 
agreement."  United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, 
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 44 (1987). 
 We have addressed the public policy exception to 
enforcement of arbitration awards in light of W.R. Grace and 
Misco in two recent decisions discussed by the parties here:  
United States Postal Service v. National Assn of Letter Carriers, 
839 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1988), and Service Employees Int'l Union 
Local 36 v. City Cleaning Company, Inc., 982 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 
1992).  In Service Employees, we explained that "[t]he public 
policy exception" to the enforcement of arbitration awards "is 
slim indeed."  Service Employees, 982 F.2d at 92.  The exception 
is available only when "the arbitration decision and award create 
an explicit conflict with an explicit public policy . . .."  Id.  
And in Letter Carriers, despite recognizing that customer and 
co-worker safety may be valid public policy, we determined that 
"a policy in favor of protecting co-workers and customers from 
[an employee's] violent conduct (assuming, arguendo, that such a 
  
policy is properly ascertained) does not require his discharge 
for its fulfillment."  Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d at 149-50.2 
 We acknowledge that public transportation safety is a 
valid public concern, but Suburban has failed to demonstrate that 
public policy requires vacation of the arbitrator's award here.  
Suburban has not provided us with "laws and legal precedents" 
which describe an "explicit" public policy; rather, what Suburban 
has described as putative public policy is more akin to the 
amorphous "public interests" that were deemed insufficient to 
articulate public policy in W.R. Grace.3  Furthermore, even if we 
                     
2
.   In three recent cases not discussed by the parties, we 
found that arbitrators' awards should be vacated on public policy 
grounds.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 
1189 (3d Cir. 1993) (Exxon Shipping II); Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Exxon Seaman's Union, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (Exxon 
Shipping I); Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992).  In each 
of those cases, however, the public policy was much more explicit 
and the conflict between it and the particular award much more 
pronounced than is the case here. 
3
.   In an effort to demonstrate that the arbitrator's award 
would conflict with explicit public policy, Suburban cites 49 
C.F.R. § 391.25, a Department of Transportation regulation 
requiring motor carriers to review annually their drivers' 
records to ascertain whether any of their drivers are 
disqualified to drive a motor vehicle under 49 C.F.R. § 391.15.  
Suburban cannot contend that the arbitrator's award prevents the 
company from making its annual review under § 391.25, however, 
nor can it suggest that the award forces the company to keep Nagy 
on the road in violation of § 391.15.  Section 391.15 
disqualifies a driver in only two circumstances:  (1) if the 
driver loses his or her driving privileges, as discussed in § 
391.15(b); or (2) if the driver commits certain "criminal [or] 
other offenses" as detailed in § 391.15(c).  Furthermore, 
citation to section 391.25 demonstrates that any "public policy" 
in favor of driver safety is much more lenient than Suburban 
would have it.  Only in egregious cases do federal regulations 
disqualify drivers.  Neither condition appears to have been met 
in Nagy's case. 
  
found that Suburban had articulated a public policy which could, 
in some cases, undermine an arbitration award, we still would not 
vacate the award here.  Suburban simply has not shown that the 
arbitrator's award in this case would explicitly conflict with 
the public policy championed by the company.  Nagy has obviously 
had many accidents, but he has also won a number of safety 
awards.  Additionally, the arbitrator's award seeks to encourage 
driver retraining; thus, it seems that the arbitrator had an eye 
toward public safety when he rendered his decision.  Therefore, 
Suburban's public policy argument fails to persuade us that the 
arbitrator's award must be vacated. 
 III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
with instructions to confirm the arbitration award. 
